We consider the problem of how an agent's knowledge can be updated. We propose a formal method of knowledge update on the basis of the semantics of modal logic S5. In our method, an update is specified according to the minimal change on both the agent's actual world and knowledge. We discuss general minimal change properties of knowledge update and show that our knowledge update operator satisfies all Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates. We characterize several specific forms of knowledge update which have important applications in reasoning about change of agents' knowledge. We also examine the persistence property of knowledge and ignorance associated with knowledge update.
We then investigate the computational complexity of model checking for knowledge update. We first show that in general the model checking for knowledge update is Σ P 2 -complete, which places the problem at the same layer in the polynomial hierarchy of the traditional model based belief update (e.g. PMA). We then identify a subclass of knowledge update problems that has polynomial time complexity for model checking. We point out that some important knowledge update problems belong to this subclass. We further address another interesting subclass of knowledge update problems for which the complexity of model checking is NP-complete.
Introduction and motivation
The well-studied issues of belief updates and belief revision [13] are concerned with the update and revision aspects of an agent's belief with respect to new beliefs. The notion of belief update has been used, and often serves as a guideline [12, 24] , in reasoning about the effect of (world altering) actions on the state of the world. Thus if φ represents the agent's belief about the world and the agent performs an action that is supposed to make ψ true in the resulting world, then the agent's belief about the resulting world can be described by φ ψ, where is the update operator of choice. Now let us consider reasoning about sensing actions [22, 23] , which in their pure form, when executed, do not change the world, but change the agent's knowledge about the world. Let sense f be a sensing action whose effect is that after it is executed the agent knows whether f is true or not. This can be expressed as Kf ∨ K¬f , where K is the modal operator Knows. The current theory of belief updates does not tell us how to do updates with respect to such gain in knowledge due to a sensing action. (Note that we can not just have ψ ≡ f ∨ ¬f and use the the notion of belief update, as f ∨ ¬f is a tautology). The major goal of this paper is to define a notion of knowledge update, analogous to belief update, where the original theory (φ) and the new theory (ψ) are in a language that can express knowledge. Such a notion would not only serve as a guideline to reason about pure and mixed sensing actions in presence of constraints, but also allow us to reason about actions corresponding to forgetting and ignorance.
We then investigate the computational complexity of model checking for knowledge update. We first show that in general the model checking problem for knowledge update is Σ The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we start with describing the particular modal logic that we plan to use in expressing knowledge, and describe the notion of k-models analogous to 'models' in classical logic. We define closeness between k-models and use it to define a particular notion of knowledge update. In Section 3 we discuss minimal change properties of knowledge update. An interesting result shows that our knowledge update operator satisfies all Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates. In Section 4, we present alternative characterizations of four particular knowledge up-dates -gaining knowledge, ignorance, sensing, and forgetting, and show their equivalence to our original notion of knowledge update. Some of these alternative characterizations are based on the formulation of reasoning about sensing actions, and thus our equivalence results serve as justification of the intuitiveness of our definition of knowledge update. In Section 5 we explore sufficiency conditions that guarantee persistence of knowledge (or ignorance) during a knowledge update. From Section 6 we start to investigate model checking complexity for knowledge update. In Section 6 we first give general background on computational complexity. In Section 7, we study the model checking complexity for the general case of knowledge update. In Section 8, we define a subclass of knowledge update problems whose model checking can be achieved in polynomial time. In Section 9, we further address an interesting intractable subclass of knowledge update problems whose model checking is lower than the genral case. Finally, in Section 10, we conclude this paper with some remarks discussions.
Closeness between k-models and knowledge update
In this section, we describe formal definitions for knowledge update. Our formalization will be based on the semantics of the propositional modal logic S5 with a single agent. In general, under Kripke semantics, a Kripke structure is a triple (W, R, π), where W is a set of possible worlds, R is an equivalence relation on W , and π is a truth assignment function that assigns a propositional valuation to each world in W . Given a Kripke structure S = (W, R, π), a Kripke interpretation is a pair M = (S, w), where w ∈ W is referred to the actual world of M . The entailment relation |= between Kripke interpretations and formulas is defined to provide semantics for formulas of S5 [4] .
In the case of single agent, however, we may restrict ourselves to those S5 structures in which the relation R is universal, i.e. each world is accessible from every world, and worlds are identified with the set of atoms true at the worlds [20] . To simplify a comparison between two worlds (e.g. Definition 2), we may view an atom p ∈ w iff w |= p. Therefore, in our context a Kripke structure (W, R, π) is uniquely characterized by W and we may simplify a Kripke interpretation as a pair (W, w) which we call a k-model, where w indicates the actual world of the agent and W presents all possible worlds that the agent may access. Note that w is in W for any k-model (W, w).
In our following description, we use a, b, c, · · · to denote primitive propositional atoms; φ, ψ, υ, · · · to denote propositional formulas without including modalities (we also call them objective formulas); and α, β, γ, µ, · · · to denote formulas that may contain modal operator K. For convenience, we use T ≡ α 1 ∧· · ·∧α k to represent a finite set of formulas {α 1 , · · · , α k } and call T a (knowledge) set. 
Given a formula
We use M od(T ) to denote the set of all k-models of T . For an objective formula φ, M od(φ) simply denotes the set of worlds w where w |= φ. In this case, w is also called a model of φ. For a formula α, we say that T entails α, denoted as
Now the basic problem of knowledge update that we would like to investigate is formally described as follows: given a k-model M = (W, w), that is usually viewed as a knowledge state of an agent, and a formula µ -the agent's new knowledge that may contain modal operator K, how do we update M to another k-model M = (W , w ) such that M |= µ and M is minimally different from M with respect to some criterion. To approach this problem, we first need to provide a definition of closeness between two k-models with respect to a given k-model. We denote
In the above definition, condition 1 simply says that the symmetric differences between w and w 1 is a proper subset of that between w and w 2 , while in condition 2, (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
Based on the k-model update, updating a formula (knowledge set) T in terms of another formula µ is then achieved by updating every k-model of T with µ. 
(3). In the proof of 2, we stated that M od( 
According to Definition 2, either condition (1) or (2) is satisfied. If condition (1) is satisfied, then (2) and (ii) and M 2 ≤ M M 3 are due to condition (2) and (iii) in Definition 2. By analyzing Definition 2, it concludes that this situation will never occur. This is because from 
Theorem 1 Let T and µ be two formulas. Then M od(T µ) =
Proof: To prove the result, we only need to show that for each
On the other hand, according to Definition 3, for
The above theorem provides an important characterization on knowledge update in terms of a particular minimal change criterion. Now the question we are interested in is whether our knowledge update operator satisfies some classical properties of belief (knowledge base) update. In recent years, belief update has been extensively studied by many researchers and its difference from belief revision is well understood [9, 18, 27] . From the observation of semantic difference between belief update and revision, Katsuno and Mendelzon argued that the original revision postulates proposed by Gardenfors el al. [5] are not quite suitable for update, and ignoring such difference may lead to unreasonable solutions [13] . Instead, Katsuno and Mendelzon proposed alternative postulates for any update operator as follows.
(U3) If both T and µ are satisfiable then T µ is also satisfiable.
Under the context of S5 modal logic, we may think all formulas occurring in the above postulates are S5 formulas. The following theorem shows that our knowledge update operator satisfies all these postulates. 
Theorem 2 Knowledge update operator defined in Definition 4 satisfies Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates (U1)-(U8).

Proof: From Definitions 3 and 4, it is easy to verify satisfies postulates (U1)-(U4). Now we prove satisfies (U5). To prove that (T
. This proves the result.
Finally, the fact that satisfies (U8) is obtained straightforward from Definitions 3 and 4.
Characterizing specific knowledge updates
While the previous section studies general minimal change properties of our knowledge update, alternative characterizations of knowledge update can be described for several specific forms. These specific forms present important features of knowledge update, and their alternative characterizations are convenient when the use of the notion of knowledge update becomes an overkill. For example, the alternative characterization of sensing update below is a much simpler characterization that is used in reasoning about sensing actions [22, 23] .
Gaining knowledge update
We first introduce a notation that will be useful in our following discussions. Let W be a set of worlds and w ∈ W . By W (w,φ)
, we denote the set {w | w ∈ W and w |= φ iff w |= φ}.
Proposition 3 Given T and Kφ where φ is objective and T |= φ. Then M = (W , w ) is a k-model of T Kφ if and only if there exists a k-model
, w). Firstly, from the condition 1 of Definition 2, it is easy to see that for any M = (W , w ) where w = w, M < M M . Therefore, from Theorem 1, to prove the result, it is sufficient to prove that for any k-model 
. Without loss of generality, we can
. Since we require that M |= Kφ, it follows that w i |= φ. Also, from the construction of W (w,φ) , we know that w i ∈ W otherwise it reduces to the case that W ⊆ W (w,φ) . Therefore, W ⊆ W and W ⊆ W . From the above discussion, it follows that
The above proposition reveals an important property about knowledge update: to know some fact, the agent only needs to restrict the current possible worlds in each of her k-models, if this fact itself is already entailed by her current knowledge set. We call this kind of knowledge update gaining knowledge update. 
Ignorance update
As a contrary case to the gaining knowledge update, we now characterize an agent ignoring a fact from her knowledge set which we call ignorance update, i.e. updating T with ¬Kφ. From Definition 1, it is easy to see that T ¬φ |= ¬Kφ. However, it should be noted that updating T ¬φ can not be used to achieve T ¬Kφ. Consider a k-model M = ({{a, b}, {a}}, {a, b}). Updating M with ¬Ka we have a possible resulting k-model M = ({{a, b}, {a}, {b}}, {a, b}), while updating M with ¬a will lead to a possible result M = ({{a, b}, {a}, {b}}, {b}). Note that both M and M entail ¬Ka, but M < M M according to Definition 2. From Theorem 1, to prove the result, we only need to show that for any 
Sensing update
Now we consider the case when µ is of the form Kφ∨K¬φ where φ is objective. Updating T with this type of µ is particularly useful in reasoning about sensing actions [22, 23] where Kφ ∨ K¬φ represents the effect of a sensing action after its execution, the agent will know either φ or its negation. We refer to such an update as a sensing update. The following proposition characterizes the update of T with a formula of the form Kφ ∨ K¬φ. It is interesting to note that the sufficient and necessary condition for a k-model of T (Kφ ∨ K¬φ) is similar to the one presented in Proposition 3. 
Forgetting update
As another important type of knowledge update, we consider the update of T with µ ≡ ¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ. This update can be thought of as the result of an agent forgetting her knowledge about the fact φ. We will refer to such an update as a forgetting update. The following proposition shows that in order to forget φ from T , for each k-model of the current knowledge set, the agent only needs to expand the set of possible worlds of this model with exactly one specific world. 
Proposition 6 Given T and µ ≡ ¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ where φ is objective. M = (W , w ) is a k-model of T µ if and only if there exists a k-model M = (W, w) of T such that (i) if M |=
In other words, a k-model of T µ must have a form M = (W , w).
From Theorem 1, to prove the result, we only need to show that for any 
Persistence of knowledge and ignorance
Like most systems that do dynamic modeling, the knowledge update discussed previously is non-monotonic in the sense that while adding new knowledge into a knowledge set, some previous knowledge in the set might be lost. However, it is important to investigate classes of formulas that are persistent with respect to an update, as this may partially simplify the underlying inference problem [26] . Furthermore, characterizing persistence is also an important issue in nonmonotonic epistemic logic reasoning because it plays an essential role in the way of how different states of agent's knowledge can be compared [3, 10, 11] .
Given T and µ, a formula α is said to be persistent with respect to the update of T with µ, if T |= α implies T µ |= α. If α is of the form Kφ, we call this persistence as knowledge persistence, while if α is of the form ¬Kφ, we call it ignorance persistence. The question that we address now is that under what conditions, a formula α is persistent with respect to the update of T with µ.
As the update of T with µ is achieved based on the update of every k-model of T with µ, our task reduces to the study of persistence with respect to a k-model update. This is defined in the following definition. 
Intuitively, the above definition specifies a partial ordering to measure the closeness between two k-models to a formula. In particular, if M 1 is a k-model of µ, then M 1 is closer to µ than all other k-models (i.e. condition 1). If neither 
Proposition 7 Let µ be a formula. For any two k-models M
This implies that both M 1 and M 2 are equally close to µ. Hence,
Given a formula µ and a sequence of k-models
where i < j. Now under this condition, if there is another formula α which satisfies the property that M j |= α implies M i |= α whenever i < j, we say that formula α is persistent with respect to formula µ. In other words, when k-models move closer to µ, α's truth value is preserved in these k-models. The following definition formalizes this idea.
Definition 7 (≤ µ -persistence) Let α, µ be two formulas. We say that α is ≤ µ -persistent if for any two k-models M
Now we have the following important relationship between ≤ µ -persistence and k-model update persistence. Res(M, µ) , we can conclude that α is persistent with respect to the update of M with µ.
Theorem 3 Let α and µ be two formulas and M be a k-model. α is persistent with respect to the update of M with
From Theorem 2, we have that ≤ µ -persistence is a sufficient condition to guarantee a formula persistence with respect to a k-model update. As will be shown next, we can provide a unique characterization for µ-persistence. We first define the notion of ordering preservation as follows.
Definition 8 (Ordering Preservation)
Given two formulas α and β. We say that ordering ≤ α preserves ordering ≤ β if for any two k-models M 1 and
The intuition behind ordering preservation is clear. That is, if ≤ α preserves ≤ β , then for any two k-models M 1 and M 2 , whenever M 1 is closer to α than M 2 , M 1 will be closer to β than M 2 as well. Finally, we have the following important result to characterize µ-persistence.
Theorem 4 Given two formulas α and µ, α is ≤ µ -persistent if and only if
(⇐) Suppose ≤ µ preserves ≤ α . From Definition 8, we have that for any two k-models M 1 and
Background on computational complexity
In the rest of this paper, we consider complexity issues of knowledge update. In particular, we investigate the computational complexity of model checking for knowledge update. For this purpose, we will restrict the underlying language to be finite.
We first introduce basic notions from complexity theory and refer to [7] for further details. Two important complexity classes are P and N P . The class of P includes those decision problems solvable by a polynomial-time deterministic Turing machine. The class of N P , on the other hand, consists of those decision problems solvable by a polynomial-time nondeterministic Turing machine.
Let C be a class of decision problems. The class P C consists of the problems solvable by a polynomial-time deterministic Truing machine with an oracle for a problem from C, while the class N P C includes the problems solvable by a nondeterministic Turing machine with an oracle for a problem in C. By co-C we mean the class consisting of the complements of the problems in C.
The classes Σ P k and Π P k of the polynomial hierarchy are defined as follows:
It is easy to see that N P = Σ P 1 and co-N P = Π P 1 . A problem A is complete for a class C if A ∈ C and for every problem B in C there is a polynomial transformation of B to A.
The prototypical Σ P k -complete and Π P k -complete problems are deciding the validity of quantified Boolean formulas (QBFs) of the form:
where E is a Boolean expression using propositional atoms over alphabets X 1 , X 2 , · · ·, and X k , and the Q i 's are alternating qualifiers from {∀, ∃} (1 ≤ i ≤ k). If Q 1 = ∃, then deciding the validity of (1) is Σ P k -complete, while deciding the validity of (1) 
Let X and Y be two finite set of propositional atoms where X and Y have the same cardinality, i.e. |X| = |Y |. For convenience, we use notion X ≡ Y to stand for formula (
We also use ¬X to denote the set {¬x i | x i ∈ X} (or formula x i ∈X ¬x i ), and use notion ¬X to stand for formula x i ∈X ¬x i . For a given formula α, we use |α| to denote the length of α.
The problem of model checking for knowledge update is described as follows: Given a knowledge set T , a formula µ, and a k-model M , deciding whether M ∈ M od(T µ). It is well known that the model checking problem for traditional belief revision and update is located at the lower end of the polynomial hierarchy from P to Σ P 2 depending on specific revision/update operators and additional restrictions (if any) [16] .
Complexity of model checking: General case
In this section, we investigate the complexity of model checking for the general case of knowledge update.
(1) Deciding whether KM \ KM 2 = ∅ and 
Then from Proposition 1 (Results 2 and 4) of [1] , it follows that
Finally we prove Result 3. We first prove the following result:
and only if for some w ∈ W and w 2 ∈ W 2 , such that
Firstly, if for all
Then there exists some φ ∈ KM 1 but φ ∈ KM and φ ∈ KM 2 . We first show that in this case, φ |= ¬( w) ∧ ¬( w 2 ) for some w ∈ W and w 2 ∈ W 2 respectively. Since φ ∈ KM , there exists some w ∈ W such that w |= ¬φ, and so φ |= ¬( w). Similarly, from φ ∈ KM 2 , there exists some w 2 ∈ W 2 such that w 2 |= ¬φ. That is φ |= ¬( w 2 ). Combine these two cases, we have φ |= ¬( w) ∧ ¬( w 2 ). On the other hand, since φ ∈ KM 1 , we have that for all w 1 ∈ W 1 , w 1 |= φ and then w 1 |= ¬( w) ∧ ¬( w 2 ).
From the above result, it observed that to decide whether KM 1 ⊆ KM 2 ∪KM , we only need to check whether there exist some w ∈ W and w 2 ∈ W 2 such that for all Proof: According to Definition 2, if
. Clearly, this can be verified in polynomial time.
If w 1 = w 2 , then we need to check the following conditions: 
Knowledge gradual update
To prove the hardness, we consider a special form of knowledge update and prove its model checking complexity is Σ P 2 -hard.
Given T and µ, we say the update of T with µ is knowledge gradual if for any
Note that, after performing a knowledge gradual update, the agent's knowledge may be decreased or increased (or without change), and the agent's actual world may be changed as well. 
Then T µ is knowledge gradual.
Proof: To prove T µ to be knowledge gradual, we need to show that for any
Based on this observation, our proof consists of two cases.
Now we specify a k-model of µ as follows:
It is easy to see that
Note Dif f (w, w
We now specify a k-model of µ as follows: M 1 = (W 1 , w 1 ), where w 1 = w and W 1 is the maximal subset of W such that for each w i ∈ W 1 ,
Again, we can specify a k-model of µ as follows: M 2 = (W 2 , w 2 ), where w 2 = w and W 2 is maximal subset of W such that for each w i ∈ W 2 ,
Finally, suppose for some X 1 ⊆ X and Y 1 ⊆ Y , E is evaluated to be true on
This implies that γ 1 does not have a k-model under this situation. Therefore, if ∃X∀Y E is not valid, all k-models of T must be k-models of γ 2 .
A tractable subclass -knowledge decreased update
In this section, we identify a subclass of knowledge update problems for which model checking can be achieved in polynomial time. We first introduce a useful notation. Let α be a S5 formula and φ α be an objective formula (i.e. no K occurs in it) occurring in α. We then say φ α is an objective sub-formula of α. We denote the set of all objective sub-formulas of α as Sub From the above definition, it is easy to see that if an update is knowledge decreased, then the actual world of the agent's state will not change, and the agent's knowledge can only be decreased. Furthermore, the set of posible worlds in the agent's resulting state can be specifically computed from her previous state. We have the following important result on the model checking for knowledge decreased update.
Theorem 7 Model checking for knowledge decreased update can be achieved in polynomial time.
Proof: Given T , µ and a k-mode M = (W , w ). Suppose T µ be knowledge decreased. To check whether M ∈ M od(T µ), we need to do the following things:
Clearly, Steps 1 and 3 can be done in polynomial time. As |Sub o (µ)| ≤ |µ|, it follows that Step 2 can be also done in polynomial time.
It is worthwhile to mention some concrete forms of knowledge decreased update which, as we have presented earlier, have important applications in practical domains.
Theorem 8 Ignorance and forgetting updates are knowledge decreased.
Proof: The proof directly follows from Propositions 4 and 6 respectively.
Corollary 1 Model checking for ignorance and forgetting updates can be achieved in polynomial time.
9 An intractable subclass -Knowledge increased update
In this section, we address another subclass of knowledge update problems whose model checking complexity are intractable but lower than the general case. Such investigation will be useful for us to design more optimal model checking algorithms for these subclasses of update problems.
As a contrary case to the knowledge decreased update, the knowledge increased update is defined as follows. It is clear that if a knowledge increased update is performed to an agent's knowledge set, it only increases the agent's knowledge and does not change the agent's actual world. Unfortunately, different from the knowledge decreased update, the model checking problem for knowledge increased update is not tractable. Hardness proof. The hardness is proved by transforming the NP-complete SAT problem to a gaining knowledge update that has been showed to be knowledge increased. Let E be a CNF on the set of propositional atoms X. We construct formulas T , µ and a k-model M over two disjoint sets X and X where |X| = |X|.
Clearly, M |= µ. We will show that E is satisfiable iff M ∈ M od(T µ). Note that since T |= X ≡X ∨ ¬E and µ = K(X ≡X ∨ ¬E), T µ is a gaining knowledge update that is knowledge increased according to Theorem 6. (⇒) Suppose E is satisfiable. Let X 1 ⊆ X such that X 1 |= E. We specify a k-model as follows: , where φ = (X ≡X) ∨ ¬E. So M is not a k-model of T µ.
It is interesting to note that some specific forms of knowledge update we discussed earlier are knowledge increased. 
Concluding Remarks
While research on reasoning about knowledge has made significant progress in the last decade, e.g. [4, 8, 14, 17, 21] , the problem of modeling the dynamics of knowledge has only received attention in recent years and mainly been motivated from the study of belief revision and update. Van der Meyden recently studied the computational aspect of knowledge modeling in distributed systems [19] where the issue of knowledge update was discussed. Although van der Meyden showed that his knowledge update presented a generalization of certain aspects of standard knowledge base update, he did not explore knowledge update from a more semantical perspective because the notion of knowledge update was only used for the purpose of efficiently implementing model checking. On the other hand, the dynamic semantics for epistemic logic was considered by Groeneveld recently. In [6] , updates on Kripke models were specified. In that update semantics, an update is defined as eliminative or conscious and knowledge is represented in a many-order setting under the possible worlds semantics. Under the eliminative update notion, an agent changes her knowledge minimally according to the new knowledge, while under the conscious update notion, an agent not only changes her knowledge by combining the new knowledge into the state, but also reflects the new knowledge at a higher-order level. While Groeneveld's work provides an initial account of knowledge update, it, however, did not examine its minimal change characterization in detail and its relationship to the traditional belief update (i.e. Whether Katsuno and Mendelzon's update postulates were satisfied). Furthermore, its other semantic and computational properties also remain unclear.
In this paper we developed an explicit notion of knowledge update as an analogous notion to belief update and illustrated its usefulness in characterizing the knowledge change of an agent in presence of new knowledge. In our formulation, knowledge update is particularly relevant in reasoning about actions and plan verifications when there are sensing or forgetting actions. We presented simpler alternative characterization of knowledge update for particular cases, and showed its equivalence to the original characterization. We discussed when particular knowledge (or ignorance) persists with respect to a knowledge update. We also undertook a further study about the complexity issue of knowledge update. In particular, we analyzed the complexity of model checking for knowledge update in the general case and in special cases. We identify special subcases where the model checking is either tractable or its complexity is lower than the general case. We expect that these results would be useful for designing more optimal model checking algorithms in the implementation of knowledge update.
We believe our work here to be a starting point on knowledge update, and as evident from the research in belief update and revision in the past decade. A lot remains to be done in knowledge update. For example, issues such as multiagent knowledge update, iterative knowledge update, abductive knowledge update, minimal knowledge in knowledge update, etc. remain to be explored. Similarly, in regards to reasoning about actions, additional specific cases of knowledge update need to be identified and simpler alternative characterization for them will be needed to be developed.
